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Abstract: 
This paper models the entrepreneurial process as both creation and discovery composed of an 
iterative two-step process where entrepreneurs create social networks based on subjective 
expectations about the future effectiveness of those networks, and then choose the innovation to 
pursue and map a search process to discover how to bring the innovation to fruition. Critical to 
this process is the mix of strong ties and weak ties that make up social networks and the ability to 
carry forward the social capital embodied in such networks. The tendency of long-existing 
entrepreneurs to be less innovative can be explained using this model. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship | Social networks | Innovation | Technology | Creation and 
discovery 
Article: 
1 Introduction 
While the study of entrepreneurship has a long history (Hébert and Link 2006a, b), it has been 
hampered by the lack of a theory about, and a conceptual framework for, understanding the 
entrepreneurial process (Shane and Venkataraman 2000; Shane 2013). In this paper, we extend 
the framework of Leyden et al. (2014) to model the entrepreneurial process as one of both 
creation and discovery composed of an iterative two-step process in which entrepreneurs create 
social networks based on subjective expectations about the future effectiveness of those 
networks, then choose an innovation to pursue and map out a search process to discover how to 
bring that innovation to fruition. 
Our model’s treatment of the creation of the entrepreneur’s social network is based on Burt’s 
(2005) work on brokerage and closure; our treatment of the exploitation of that network is based 
in part on Alvarez and Barney’s (2007) characterization of entrepreneurial creation and search 
theories. However, unlike Alvarez and Barney who present entrepreneurial creation and search 
theories as components of a long debate about whether entrepreneurial activity is essentially a 
process of discovery (an argument perhaps most notably associated with Kirzner (1985)) or a 
process of creation (perhaps most notably associated with Schumpeter (1934)), our view is that 
the discovery/creation choice is a false one; in reality both discovery and creation are present in 
the entrepreneurial process.1 We characterize the entrepreneurial process as one in which the 
entrepreneur, given an endogenous social network innovates within the context of an uncertain 
environment. 
Our model of the entrepreneurial process is illustrated in Fig. 1. The process is an iterative one in 
which the entrepreneur repeatedly sequences through the creation of a social network and the 
search for a defined innovation. The social network creation process is inherently and 
irremediably an uncertain one (Knight 1921; Shackle 1979). The search for a defined innovation 
is also an uncertain one. To the extent that the search has dimensions of being an engineering 
problem, it has the potential for being converted, at least in part, into one of risk or certainty; that 
is, it is in terms of Alvarez and Barney (2007) a process of discovery. This complicates the 
overall entrepreneurial process because the choices made in the first creation phase having 
implications for the environment in which the entrepreneur searches, and the results of the search 
process (successful or failing) having implications for the process of revising the knowledge 
network. An important implication is that there is generally no optimal social network structure. 
Instead, that structure, which is the result of some mix of brokerage and closure activities, will 
depend on circumstances particular to the entrepreneur. 
 
Fig. 1 The entrepreneurial process 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we examine the 
second step of the entrepreneurial process—the search for an innovation given a knowledge 
network in place and the goal already decided. Then, we turn back to an examination of the first 
step of the entrepreneurial process—the creation of the entrepreneur’s social network, and we 
explore some implications of this model with particular emphasis on its ability to provide insight 
on the differential behavior of entrepreneurs. The arguments in these sections are derived from 
an extension of Leyden et al. (2014) in several dimensions. First, uncertainty is formally 
introduced into the entrepreneur’s process of creating a social network and searching over it for 
an innovation. Second, the social network, following Granovetter (1973) and Burt (2005), can 
now be characterized as a mix of strong and weak ties with others. And third, our extended 
model allows us to offer an explanation as to why entrepreneurs differ (e.g., nascent versus 
incumbent entrepreneurs; serial versus one-time entrepreneurs), thus leading to testable 
hypotheses. 
Finally, the paper concludes with summary remarks and a statement about the policy 
implications of our model. The technical elements of our model are described in mathematical 
terms in the Appendix. 
2 The search for an innovation 
The conceptualization of the innovation process begins with an entrepreneur who has a social 
network in place and has decided on which innovation to pursue. As mentioned, this decision has 
engineering-like dimensions and, following Alvarez and Barney (2007), it can be characterized 
in the context of discovery. However, we extend Alvarez and Barney and allow for the 
possibility of uncertainty in this discovery process, although if that uncertainty can be resolved to 
a matter of probabilistic certainty, the discovery process ultimately will then be characterized by 
risk. 
The entrepreneur’s search for an innovation is a costly one that develops over time against the 
backdrop of the entrepreneur’s resource constraints and social network. That search process can 
be conceived as an exploration of various combinations of inputs—knowledge, actions, and 
resources—that will generate the desired innovation. Imposed on this process is the 
entrepreneur’s subjective assessment of the likelihood of finding a successful combination of 
inputs that will ensure success in the search for the desired innovation. 
The entrepreneur begins by exploring input combinations that are in the entrepreneur’s 
subjective view most likely to yield success. If success is not achieved initially, the entrepreneur 
then widens the range of input combinations, again guided by a subjective assessment of the 
likelihood of finding a successful input combination given the lack of success to that point in 
time. This sequence of increasing search areas is illustrated in Fig. 2 for the case of two 
inputs, x 1 and x 2. Initially, the entrepreneur begins with a relatively small search 
region A 1 chosen because of the entrepreneur’s subjective belief that the likelihood of finding a 
successful input combination is greatest within that region. If not successful, the entrepreneur 
expands to a larger region A 2, and continues to search over ever widening regions until an 
innovation is found or until it is no longer desirable to search. 
 
Fig. 2 Regions of entrepreneurial search among knowledge, actions, and resources 
There is no reason to believe that the search regions A i are convex, or even connected. Thus, for 
example, Fig. 2 includes the case of an entrepreneur who, after failing to find a successful input 
combination in regions A 1, A 2, and A 3, is of two minds about what combinations of inputs 
might be successful and concludes that input combination most likely to be successful will either 
be an input combination with a very high level of input x 1 and a very low level of input x 2, or an 
input combination with a very low level of input x1 and a very high level of input x 2. Hence, the 
entrepreneur’s next search region A 4 is a disconnected set. 
Searching is a costly process with the expected cost of searching increasing as the size of the 
search region increases. Search costs are assumed to be a negative function of the effectiveness 
of the entrepreneur’s social network, with effectiveness tied to the heterogeneity of that social 
network (which is commensurate with the number of weak ties which we define below) and the 
cohesion of that same social network (which is defined by the number of strong ties, again 
defined below). Thus, the cost of search can be represented by the function c S (A, γ), with 
increases in A, which represents the size of the region A, resulting in greater cost, but with 
increases in the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social network, represented by γ, resulting in 
lower cost. 
Because the search process is costly, the entrepreneur’s choice of where to search is determined 
by his/her subjective estimates of the likelihood of finding an input combination that succeeds in 
achieving the desired innovation. For a given search region of size A, the entrepreneur will 
choose the boundaries of that search region so as to maximize the subjective likelihood L(A|γ) of 
successfully finding an input combination that results in successfully achieving the desired 
innovation. Note that this subjective likelihood function, in addition to being a function of the 
size of the search region, will also be a function of the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social 
network with the greater the effectiveness of this social network, the greater the entrepreneur’s 
subjective assessment of the likelihood of success.2 
2.1 The entrepreneur’s resource constraint 
We assume that the entrepreneur seeks funding from a capital market (Link et al. 2014), and that 
the entrepreneur’s access to financial capital is constrained by the expectation (e) that the 
suppliers of capital hold regarding the value of the entrepreneur’s innovation project, V e. 
Because the innovation process is an uncertain one, the expected value of the project that the 
capital market holds will be subjective. Moreover, because there is no guarantee of success, this 
expected value can be defined as the subjectively determined value, V, of the innovation were it 
to be successfully achieved times the subjective probability of success P(A|K), where K is the 
capital market’s knowledge base. It is important to note the different perspective of the capital 
market regarding the chance that the entrepreneur will succeed. For the entrepreneur, the focus is 
on finding a combination of inputs that will yield success. Because there is likely to be more than 
one input combination associated with success, and because the entrepreneur knows that he/she 
does not know the entire universe of possibilities, one cannot speak in terms of probabilities, 
which in terms of formal theory must sum to one across all possibilities. Thus, the entrepreneur 
thinks in terms of the less constrained notion of likelihoods. For the capital market, in contrast, 
the focus is not on possible input combinations that might be successful. Instead, it is on the 
entrepreneur and whether that entrepreneur will be successful. The universe of possibilities is 
then the set of all entrepreneurs who come to the capital market for financial support. That set is 
known empirically, and so through the analysis of past successes and failures of entrepreneurs 
using statistical models and portfolio theory, the capital market constructs a probability of 
success. 
The assessment of the probability of success by the capital market will be a function of the size 
of the entrepreneur’s search region, A, because that information can be easily conveyed to the 
capital market; indeed, it is likely to be part of the entrepreneur’s funding proposal (Schott and 
Sedaghat, 2014).3 However, the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social network, γ, is not 
included because of the amorphous nature of this variable would be difficult to convey to the 
capital market. In essence, γ is private information. As a result, the capital market will base its 
subjective assessment of the probability of success on its own knowledge base, K, comprising 
methods for estimating the end value, V, of the innovation were it to be achieved and for 
estimating the chances of success using portfolio theory. Because this estimation of success does 
not include knowledge of the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social network, the subjective 
probability of success, P(A|K), held by the owners of private equity may not be the same as the 
subjective likelihood of success, L(A|γ), held by the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur in choosing 
to engage in the uncertain innovation process will be constrained by the requirement that the cost 
of the project, c S (A,γ), not exceed the expected value V e of the project held by the owners of 
private equity. 
2.2 The optimal search region 
While profits are clearly part of what motivates the entrepreneur, we assume that the motivation 
of the entrepreneur is better modeled as seeking to maximize the likelihood of success than 
simply to maximize profits. This assumption thus blends aspects of the teleological theories of 
human action described by Alvarez and Barney (2007): assumptions about the nature of human 
objectives and about the nature of individuals. Given this motivation, the entrepreneur’s problem 
is one of choosing a region of size A* that will maximize the entrepreneur’s subjective likelihood 
of successfully identifying an input combination that achieves the desired innovation, L(A|γ), 
subject to the resource constraint that the expected cost to the entrepreneur, c S (A, γ), not exceed 
the expected value V e of the project as assessed by the owners of private equity. Moreover, 
because increasing the size of a search region will always increase the entrepreneur’s subjective 
assessment of the likelihood of success, the resource constraint will always hold as an equality, 
that is, c S (A, γ) = V e. As a result, the condition that the expected cost, c S (A, γ), equals the 
expected value, V e, of the project is equivalent to the condition that the expected average cost of 
the project per unit of area searched equals the expected average value of the project per unit of 
area searched, that is, c S (A, γ)/A = V e/A. 
Given this structure, the entrepreneur’s problem and its solution can be represented by Fig. 3. 
Given that the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social network is some γ 1, the solution to the 
entrepreneur’s problem will be at point E 1 in Fig. 3 where the expected average value line, V 
e/A, 
intersects the average cost curve, c S(A, γ 1)/A, and hence the size of optimal search region will 
be A 1*. 
 
Fig. 3 Optimal solution to the entrepreneur’s innovation search problem 
Note that this solution depends on the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social network, γ. 
Because greater social network effectiveness reduces the cost of searching, all else held constant, 
an increase in the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s network reduce the entrepreneur’s cost of 
searching. Figure 3 illustrates such a case with an increase in network effectiveness 
from γ 1 to γ 2 resulting in the size of the optimal search region increasing to A 2*. 
2.3 The creation of a social network 
As demonstrated above, the entrepreneur’s social network is crucial to the entrepreneur’s project. 
It likely plays a role in the identification of the entrepreneur’s desired innovation and is clearly 
critical in determining the search regions over which the entrepreneur searches and therefore the 
success of the entrepreneur. The more effective is the entrepreneur’s social network, the greater 
will be the size of the optimal search region and therefore the greater will be the chance of 
successfully discovering an input combination that results in achieving the desired innovation. 
The question therefore becomes what determines the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social 
network and to what extent does the entrepreneur have control of that effectiveness. 
Following Granovetter (1973, p. 1361), the entrepreneur’s social network can be characterized as 
a mix of strong and weak ties with others, the distinction between those ties depending on ‘the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie.’ As Burt (2005) notes, strong ties are associated with a 
shared body of knowledge, group cohesion, and entrepreneurial control; weak ties by contrast are 
associated with less group cohesion and entrepreneurial control but have the virtue of providing 
access to a heterogeneous set of knowledge and perspectives. In essence, then, weak ties are 
about creativity and new ideas, strong ties are about organizational integrity, and both ties are 
conducive to the effectiveness of the social network. Evidence presented by Burt suggests that 
weak and strong ties have synergistic effects on the effectiveness of the social network. As a 
result, we can visually represent the relationship between strong ties, β, and weak ties, α,  by an 
iso-effectiveness map such as the set of curves labeled as γ 1 < γ 2 < γ 3 in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4 Optimal social network effectiveness 
The entrepreneur assembles a social network through what Burt (2005) calls brokerage (i.e., the 
creation of weak ties) and closure (that is, the creation of strong ties). Such actions require 
resources. However, unlike the search process, the entrepreneur cannot turn to capital markets 
for funding because the desired innovation may not yet be determined and because of the 
amorphous nature of social networks. Moreover, the nature of the project and the probability of 
its success from the perspective of capital markets are predicated on the existence of the 
entrepreneur’s social network and therefore cannot be evaluated before the social network has 
been created. As a result, the entrepreneur must rely on internal resources to fund the network 
creation process. Those internal resources, or endowments, come in two forms. The first is a 
monetary endowment that can be used to create strong and weak ties; the second is an in-kind 
endowment in the form of a pre-existing social network. Thus, if the entrepreneur’s monetary 
endowment is some c 0 Ndollars, and its network endowment is composed of β 0 amount of 
strong ties and α 0 amount of weak ties, the entrepreneur’s production possibilities frontier can be 
represented by the line ABCD in Fig. 4. Note that this production possibilities frontier assumes a 
constant marginal cost of creating strong ties and a constant marginal cost of creating weak ties 
(see the Appendix for details). In Fig. 4, those marginal costs are labeledp α (for the marginal 
cost of acquiring weak ties) and p β (for the marginal cost of acquiring strong ties). Following 
Burt’s (2005) characterization of the problems of echo and rigidity that arise from closure, we 
assume that the marginal cost of weak ties increases with the size of the strong tie 
endowment, β 0. 
The solution to the entrepreneur’s network problem is that mix of strong and weak ties that 
maximizes the effectiveness of the created network. Given the convex production possibilities 
frontier and the concave iso-effectiveness curves, that solution will be where the production 
possibilities frontier is just tangent to the highest possible iso-effectiveness curve that intersects 
the production possibilities frontier. In Fig. 4, that solution is noted by the pair (α*, β*). 
2.4 Why do entrepreneurs differ? 
Our theoretical model explains a variety of entrepreneurial behaviors. For example, consider the 
behavior of nascent versus incumbent entrepreneurs (Acs and Audretsch 1988). It has often been 
observed that nascent entrepreneurs are more creative than incumbent entrepreneurs. 
Recognizing that over time an entrepreneur will cycle through the process of network creation 
and innovation search many times (recall Fig. 1), the difference in creativity between the two 
entrepreneurs can be explained by the growing network endowment for the incumbent 
entrepreneur. With time, the incumbent entrepreneur will have a greater and greater endowment 
of strong ties. While that results in a more effectively run organization, it also increases the 
marginal cost of acquiring weak ties that are the source of creativity. (In terms of Fig. 4, it results 
in a steeper production possibilities frontier.) The increase in the cost of weak ties will generally 
result in less of an effort to create weak ties and more of an effort to create strong ties (i.e., 
tighten up the structure of the organization), reducing still further the focus on creativity. Note, 
however, that such behavior is rational, for to do otherwise would be to generate a less than 
optimally effective social network and therefore a reduced subjective likelihood of successfully 
locating an innovation. However, to the extent such bias is broader so that there is also a 
rejection of existing weak ties as Burt (2005) suggests, the result can be an entrepreneur with 
reduced ability to innovate. 
Another noted difference between entrepreneurs is with respect to the higher success rate among 
some serial entrepreneurs. Within the context of our model, the key to understanding this 
phenomenon is again the cycling process illustrated in Fig. 1 and the growing network 
endowment for the serial entrepreneur. It may be harder, though not impossible, for a serial 
entrepreneur to maintain strong ties with each new venture. But weak ties are easier to maintain, 
and to the extent that the network endowment of the serial entrepreneur maintains those weak 
ties, over time the serial entrepreneur’s endowment of weak ties will grow. (In terms of Fig. 4, 
the production possibilities frontier will shift further to the right with each new venture.) With 
such growth comes an increasing ability to establish an effective social network with an 
emphasis on creativity. 
3 Conclusions 
The literature on entrepreneurship contains a debate over whether entrepreneurial behavior is 
essentially one of discovery or creation. We argue that this is a false choice and that in fact 
entrepreneurial behavior in general includes both. We model that inclusion through an iterative 
two-step process in which the entrepreneur creates a social network based on subjective 
expectations about the future effectiveness of that network, chooses the innovation to pursue, and 
then maps out a search process using that social network to discover how to bring the desired 
innovation to fruition. 
Critical to this process of creation and discovery is the mix of strong ties and weak ties that make 
up the entrepreneur’s social network and the ability to carry forward the social capital embodied 
in that social network. This implies that there is no ideal template for an entrepreneur to follow in 
terms of creating a social network. Instead, each entrepreneur must construct a network that 
maximizes its expected likelihood of success based on the particulars of that entrepreneur. Thus, 
long-existing entrepreneurs have a tendency to become less innovative as the social network 
becomes more and more internally focused on the creation and maintenance of strong ties, and 
serial entrepreneurs, by being able to jettison older strong ties but maintain weak ties, are able to 
become increasingly creative and effective in the innovation process. 
We have not explored the public policy implications of this model, but can sketch in rough terms 
what such policy should be. In brief, because there is a general tendency toward the creation of 
strong ties over time, public policy should focus on the creation of weak ties and on creating the 
ability to keep strong ties from overwhelming the innovation process. The creation of weak ties 
can come both by reducing the cost of interactions and by increasing the number of potential 
points of interaction through a vibrant education system. To keep strong ties under control, it 
suggests increased flexibility in the ability of entrepreneurs to start up new organizations and 
shut down old ones. Note, however, that this should not be interpreted as a dismissal of strong 
ties in general. Like weak ties, they serve an important function in the innovation process. 
Appendix: Derivation of toward a theory of the entrepreneurial process 
The search for an innovation 
Given a desired innovation and a social network, the entrepreneur’s efforts focus on exploring 
various combinations of knowledge, actions, and resources (hereafter inputs) thought to have a 
reasonable chance of producing the innovation. Let N be the total number of possible inputs so 
that input sets can be represented by N × 1 vectors x ∈ R n (some entries in the vectors perhaps 
being zero). 
The search for a combination of inputs x that will generate the desired outcome is assumed to 
take place sequentially over time. Letting A t ∈ R n represent the region of the input space 
explored in time t, the entrepreneur searches over increasing larger regions. Thus: 
A0⊂A1⊂A2⊂… (1) 
Searching is a costly process. Assume that the cost of searching is a positive function of the size 
of the region explored and the degree to which the entrepreneur has the ability to engage in 
creative cognition, and assume that the ability to engage in creative cognition is a positive 
function of the effectiveness, γ, of the entrepreneur’s social network. Thus, let A t be the 
Lebesgue measure (that is, the size) of region A t : 
At=A(At)=∫x∈Ax dx. (2) 
We can thus define the cost of searching as: 
cSt=cS(At,γ). (3) 
Assume that the costs of searching increase at a (weakly) increasing rate with the size of the 
search region: 
∂cS/∂At>0,∂2cS/∂A2t≥0, (4) 
and decrease at a decreasing rate with the effectiveness of the entrepreneur’s social network: 
∂cS/∂γ<0,∂2cS/∂γ2<0. (5) 
The average cost of searching can then be defined as: 
c¯S=cS(At,γ)/At. (6) 
Assume also that the average cost, c¯S, is convex with respect to A t 
At(∂2cS/∂A2t)−2(∂cS/∂At)+2cS/At>0. (7) 
Because the entrepreneurial process is an uncertain one, the likelihood of finding a successful 
input combination in a given region A t is objectively unknown. As a result, the entrepreneur is 
guided by subjective estimates of the likelihood of success. Let the entrepreneur’s subjective 
likelihood of success in region A t be defined by the function Λ(A t |γ), and note that this 
likelihood function is a function of the entrepreneur’s social network. Given the pattern of search 
regions described by Eq. (1), this subjective likelihood function will increase as the entrepreneur 
widens the search region. Thus: 
Λ(At|γ)∋0≤Λ(At|γ) and Λ(At|γ)<Λ(At+1|γ). (8) 
Note that because the cost of searching increases with the size of the search region, the 
entrepreneur has an incentive given any region A t to define the boundaries of A t so as to 
maximize Λ(A t |γ). As a result theA t is uniquely associated with Λ(A t |γ), and we can redefine 
this subjective likelihood function in terms of the size At of the region A t: 
L(At|γ)∋0≤L(At|γ) and L(At|γ)<L(At+1|γ). (9) 
To fund the innovation process, assume that the entrepreneur uses capital markets. As a result, 
the entrepreneur’s access to capital is constrained by the capital market’s expected value, V e, of 
the project. That expected value can be defined as the product of the ultimate expected value V of 
the project were it to succeed and the (subjective) probability of success P(A t |K), 
where K represents the capital market’s M-dimensional knowledge set (K ∈ R M ): 
Ve(V,At|K)=V⋅P(At|K). (10) 
Thus, the entrepreneur’s resource constraint will be: 
cS(At,γ)≤Ve(V,At|K). (11) 
The solution to the entrepreneur’s problems depends on the objective of the entrepreneur. We 
assume that the objective of the entrepreneur is to maximize the likelihood of successfully 
innovating. Thus, the entrepreneur’s objective is to choose a region of size A* that will maximize 
the likelihood L(A t |γ) of success in achieving the desired entrepreneurial outcome subject to the 
budget constraint (11). Because increasing the size, A t , of a search region will always increase 
the likelihood of success (recall Eq. (9)), the resource constraint (11) will always hold as an 
equality: 
cS(At,γ)=Ve(V,At|K) (12) 
which is equivalent to the condition that average cost is equal to the average value of searching: 
cS(At,γ)/At=Ve(V,At|K)/At. (13) 
Figure 3 provides an illustration of this problem and its solution. Note that the outcomes noted 
above are ex ante. In practice, the entrepreneur engages in a sequential process of exploration. If 
he or she finds success before the search area reaches A*, he/she will stop searching, and 
profits ex post will be higher than expected. If he/she does not find success after having searched 
the region A*, he/she will stop searching, and profits ex post will be lower than expected, and in 
fact will be negative. 
Entrepreneurial network creation 
Social networks are created by entrepreneurs to aid in deciding which innovation to pursue and 
in searching for that innovation. The determination of the various search regions, A t , and the 
costs associated with searching them, depends on the effectiveness, γ, of the social network. 
Because the process of innovation search described in the text can only take place after a social 
network is in place, the process of creating the social network must take place before, and 
independent of the later innovation search process. 
Social networks are composed of bonds between individuals and/or organizations with varying 
types of knowledge. The effectiveness of an entrepreneur’s social network is determined by the 
degree of heterogeneity in the set of knowledge embodied in the social network, and by the 
degree of closure, that is, the degree to which the individuals/organizations, in the network are 
bound closely into an integral whole. We assume that the degree of heterogeneity and of closure 
can be represented, respectively, by the non-negative variables α and β. 
The effectiveness, γ, of a given network is inherently and irremediably uncertain. It is therefore a 
matter of subjective conjecture by the entrepreneur. Nonetheless, we assume that entrepreneurs 
believe that α and βare both valuable components of any network and that there is to some 
degree or other a trade-off between the two, that is, that a reduction in one can to some extent be 
compensated by an increase in the other. Assume then that the entrepreneur’s subjective 
estimation of the effectiveness of a social network is a positive, strict quasi-concave function 
of α and β: 
 (14) 
As a result, we can represent the relationship between γ and the various values of α and β by an 
iso-effectiveness diagram similar to the iso-quant diagram used in the standard microeconomic 
theory of the firm. Figure 4 represents such a diagram with γ 1 < γ 2 < γ 3. 
The cost of assembling a social network is assumed to be a positive, linear function of α and β: 
cN=pαα+pββ (15) 
where p α and p β are the marginal costs of α and β. In addition, based on Burt’s (2005) 
characterization of the problems of echo and rigidity that arise from closure, assume that the 
marginal cost of α is an increasing function of the entrepreneur’s endowment, β 0 (see below for 
the characterization of the entrepreneur’s endowment): 
 (16) 
In choosing the optimal mix of α and β, the entrepreneur cannot access funding from capital 
markets. Those funds are provided on the basis of the capital market’s estimation of the value of 
the entrepreneur’s project and the probability of success. But the nature of the project and the 
probability of its success are predicated on the existence of an entrepreneurial social network and 
therefore cannot be evaluated before the social network has been created. Therefore, the 
entrepreneur must rely on internal resources to fund the network creation process. 
Assume that the entrepreneur has access to two sources of internal resources. The first source is a 
pre-existing social network that the entrepreneur has already created. That pre-existing social 
network essentially means that the entrepreneur will have an endowment of α = α 0 and an 
endowment of β = β 0. The second source is a general monetary endowment c 0 
N that can be used 
to acquire α and β. Thus, the entrepreneur’s production possibilities frontier can be derived by 
setting c N  = c 0 
N in Eq. (15) and accounting for the endowments (see Fig. 4): 
cN=pα(α−α0)+pβ(β−β0)∋α≥α0andβ≥β0. (17) 
The solution to this network creation problem is to choose that mix of α and β that achieves the 
greatest expected value of the network, that is, that mix such that the marginal rate of substitution 
is equal to the marginal rate of transformation (see Fig. 4): 
 (18) 
The effect on the eventual levels of α and β of different marginal cost and endowments will 
depend on the specific structure of the entrepreneur’s subjective iso-effectiveness of the social 
network map. However, for a given social network map, we can note the following observations: 
 A higher marginal cost of α, p α , will mean a steeper budget line and hence a desire for 
relatively more βand less α. 
 A higher marginal cost of β, p β , will mean a flatter budget line and hence a desire for 
relatively less βand more α. 
 A higher resource endowment, c 0
 N , will mean a budget line further to the northwest. The 
effect on α andβ will depend on the nature of the iso-effectiveness map. 
 A higher endowment of α will mean the budget line will be further to the right but with 
the same slope. Hence, the effect will be similar to that associated with a higher resource 
endowment except that the minimum amount of α will be higher. 
 A higher endowment of β will mean the budget line will be vertically higher and steeper. 
As a result, the effect will be a combination of the effect of a higher endowment and a 
higher marginal cost of α, with the added restriction that the minimum amount of β will 
be higher. 
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Footnotes 
1 de Jong and Marsili (2014) present important empirical evidence that the realization of 
opportunities exhibits both Schumpeterian and Kirznerian characteristics. 
 2 This point is emphasized by Schott and Sedaghat (2014) under the implicit assumption that the 
size of the network and its effectiveness are positively related. 
3 To the extent that size of the network is positively related to the size of the firm and to the 
technological maturity of the firm, then Link’s (1980) finding—formulated as a test of the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis—that the returns to R&D investments at the firm level is a function of 
the size of the firm might have policy implications regarding public support of R&D and related 
innovative activity in small versus large firms. 
 
